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Capital Adequacy Requirement
and Bank Behaviour in Nigeria

INTRODUCTION

T

here is still divergence of opinion, amongst
researchers, analysts and bank regulators, on the
efciency of the formalized Capital Adequacy
Requirement (CAR) decades after its adoption
following the rst Basel Accord of 1988. While some
are of the view that the framework helps strengthens
the banking system stability and soundness, as well as
reduce competitive inequality, others opined that it
has the capability of impacting negatively on
intermediation that could lead to credit crunch with
the consequences of declining output (BCBS, 1999).
The advocates of CAR usually support their argument
with the surge in risk-based capital ratios in developed
countries few years after the adoption of the Basel 1
Accord. The industry capital to risk-weighted assets
ratio of the Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US, on the
average rose remarkably from 9.3 per cent in 1988 to
11.2 per cent in 19961. Opponents, on the other hand,
argued that the rise in CAR could be a function of
adjustment in the denominator – risk weighted assets
or a consequence of market discipline. They
supported their argument with the coincidental
decline in output in the industrialized countries of the
world during the period of improved CAR. For
instance, between the same period, 1989 to 1991
when the US recorded appreciable CAR, it also
witnessed output decline from 4.18 per cent in 1988 to
3.67, 1.89 and -0.42 per cents in 1989, 1990 and 1991,
respectively2.
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Abstract
The divergent views on the usefulness of capital
adequacy ratio (CAR) in controlling the risk appetite
of banks necessitates further research on its efciency
and effectiveness. Whereas proponents of CAR
believe that it enhances the soundness and stability of
the banking system, opponents contend that it can
impedes on the intermediating capabilities of banks
and possibly ignites credit crunch that could induce
fall in the level of output. This study empirically veries
the inuence of CAR on the behavior of banks in
Nigeria. The study adopts a system of simultaneous
equation, in the tradition of Maraghni (2017) using
Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) approach
on micro-level annual data of banks in Nigeria from
2007 to 2018. The results reveal, amongst others, that
capital adequacy ratio indeed moderates bank
appetite for risk and, as a feedback, risk taking
behavior of banks in-turn enhances capital
adequacy ratio. The study concludes that there is the
strong need for regulatory authorities to often monitor
banks appetite for risk, particularly in period of
economic booms to avoid excessive risk that could
erode their capital during burst that could aggravate
loan default.

The Basel Accord set a minimum standard risk-based
capital requirement for banks to serve as an
instrument of limiting risk and or losses, hence
protecting nancial beneciaries particularly the
depositors. Although, the CAR requirement as
endorsed by the G10 countries was intended for
internationally active banks, but realizing the
usefulness of the concept of measuring the strength
of banks as well as its potential efcacy as an early
warning signal for bank regulators, it was endorsed by
many other countries and applied to many banks
including those outside the intended bracket.
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) adopted the riskbased capital adequacy requirement for Deposit
Money Banks (DMBs) setting the domestic standard

Key words: Basel accord, capital adequacy, bank
behavior, depositors, risk, Panel, GMM.
JEL Classication: G18, G21, G28

68

APRIL - JUNE, 2020

Volume 44, No. 2
far above the international minimum requirement of
8.0 per cent as provided for by Basel I Accord. As a fall
out of the global nancial crisis (GFC) that started
from the mortgage sector of the US in 2007, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the
Financial Stability Board (FSB), developed a
framework for monitoring Domestic Systemically
Important Banks (D-SIBs) besides that of the Global
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs).
Thus, the Central Bank of Nigeria in collaboration with
the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC)
followed suit by designing a supervisory framework for
D-SIBs in Nigeria. The systemically Important Banks
(SIBs) were then required to keep a minimum of 16.0
per cent, while it was set at 15.0 per cent for
international banks and 10.0 per cent for national and
regional banks. Despite the adoption as well as
stringent requirements set for CAR, the country still
witnessed crisis in the banking system leading to
intervention of the CBN through capital injection in
form of Tier 2 capital, nationalization and outright sale.
To these effects, researchers, market players and
participants wonder the efcacy claim of risk-based
capital requirement through its acclaimed capacity
to moderate the appetite for risk of bank and thus
improving their nancial health and soundness.

with the mobilization of short-term deposit liabilities to
create long-term assets. The provision of liquidity
services leaves banks expose to runs (Diamond and
Dybvig, 1983). Given this scenario and considering
that the expectations of depositors on their deposits is
a function of place and time of withdrawal, in line with
the principle of rst come, rst serve, a run can occur
on banks assets even if there is sufcient information to
the depositors about the quality of banks assets. Any
panic, for instance, arising from whatever reason,
could induce competitive withdrawal by depositors in
order to outsmart each other so as never to be cut-off
by the run. This could lead to premature bankruptcy
of even nancially sound banks. More so, information
asymmetry about asset of a bank, could make the
bank susceptible to more runs.
If crisis or run on a bank is ignited by information about
its poor asset quality or performance, it can then be
argued that it is benecial to the system by submitting
to the functionality of the concept of market
discipline, but if the crisis or run is a function of panic
arising from wrong signals, then it is detrimental to the
system. This is because the run or crisis becomes highly
costly due to the premature exit of the bank and the
consequent disruption to the system, arising from
contagion effect (Santos, 2000).

It is in this regard that this paper, seeks to investigate
the capital-lending relationships of banks in Nigeria
using micro level data. To achieve this, the paper is
structured into ve sections, including this
introduction. Section two details the evolution of
capital adequacy requirement as well as relevant
empirical review while section three explains the
empirical technique used for the analysis. Section four
analyses the results and the last section concludes the
study as well as proffer some policy advice.
2

Theoretical Underpinning and Review of
Empirical Literature

2.1

Theoretical Underpinning

2.1.2

The depositors' representation hypothesis ensued
from the corporate governance problem of PrincipalAgent hypothesis, arising from the separation of
ownership from management of business. The
separation of ownership from management of
business induces moral hazard and adverse selection
problem, hence necessitates monitoring of business
managers. However, it requires numerous things to
effectively monitor managers including access to
adequate information about their behavior which is
costly to come-by, thereby making monitoring not
only expensive but also difcult and complicated.
The situation of monitoring become even more
daunting and challenging, if we recognize the fact
that most of the depositors are not only small holders
but also either uninformed or not informed enough to
access the required information or process it
meaningfully. Worse still, individual depositors
monitoring could tantamount to waste of effort and
resources. These complexities that is capable of
rendering useless, monitoring by depositors,
necessitates the need for coordinated monitoring by
a representative, be it either private or public (see
Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993b).

The need for the regulation stems from the possibility
of market failure arising either from externalities,
market power or information asymmetry among
participating agents. Specically, the need for
regulating banks is justied based on two key
hypotheses: The systemic risk hypothesis and the
depositors' representative hypothesis.
2.1.1

Depositors' Representative Hypothesis

Systemic Risk Hypothesis

The issue of liquidity mismatch constitutes an
enormous risk to the banking business. Banks contend
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2.1.3

innovations in the nancial system, the Basel I Accord
was modied several times. The rst amendment
occurred in 1996 when banks were mandated to set
aside sufcient capital to cover market risk arising
from variations in interest rate and equities, foreign
exchange risk and commodities risk.

Why Emphasis on Capital

Modigliani and Miller (1958) had long before the birth
of Basel Accords steered debate on the
consequences of a rm deviating from an optimal
capital structure which they opined to be the
determinants of the value of a rm, in a world
assumed to be frictionless with perfect information. In
the banking sector, two key issues were considered in
this regard, namely: access to safety nets such as
deposit insurance and the quality of bank capital.

Despite these modications to Base I Accord, market
analysts continued to argue that the CAR was of no
economic foundation, as the risk weights were neither
in consonance with the risk of the obligor nor
encompass the benets arising from diversication
(Santos, 2000). More so, innovations in the nancial
system paved way for managers to polish their books
in such a way that the resultant CAR only improves
without the intended corresponding improvement in
the nancial soundness of the banks (Jones, 2000). This
development necessitated the introduction of Basel II
in June 2004.

Deposit insurance attract less attention, due to its
inherent consequences of incentivizing appetite for
risk by bank managers. For instance, bank managers
are likely to take more risk, if they know that in case of
run, insurance will take care of the depositors. The
possibility of shifting risk to insurance by managers and
other possible externalities that could lead to crisis in
the banking sector necessitates the choice and
emphasis on capital regulation.
2.2

The Basel II consist of three pillars, namely: minimum
capital requirements that intends to develop, expand
and further standardized the key rules set out in the
1988 Accord, the review of capital adequacy and
assessment of internal process, and effective
disclosure to serve as a means to strengthen market
discipline device as well as enhance sound banking
practices.

Evolution of Capital Adequacy Requirement

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
was a formation of the central banks of the Group of
10 (G10) countries of Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the
UK and the US. The idea of the formation of BCBS arose
due to the strenuous concern, in the early 1980s,
about the nancial health of international banks and
unfair competition among them.

This however was not sufcient to avert the 2007/08
global nancial crisis (GFC) that started from the
mortgage sector of the US, hence the need for
additional measures, thus, the introduction of Basel III
which was agreed upon by the BCBS members in
2010–2011. Basel III was mostly aimed at strengthening
bank capital requirements via increasing the liquidity
of banks and reducing their leverage. The guidelines
of the Basel III are built on three key pillars, namely:
minimum capital requirement, supervisory review and
market discipline.

Basel, I Accord of 1988 focused largely on credit risk,
hence the introduction of CAR derived as regulatory
capital to risk-weighted assets. The Basel I accord
requires international banks to keep a minimum riskadjusted capital of 8.0 per cent. The Accord requires
that at least half of the capital should be from Tier 1
sources which consist mainly of equity capital and
disclosed reserves, while Tier 2 capital should consist of
hybrid debt capital instruments, amongst others.
Recognizing risk-adjusted assets as the total sum both
from the risk adjusted assets on and off-balance
sheet, the Accord assigned the weights of 0, 20, 50
and 100 per cents to one of four risk buckets using the
bucket weight. It however encourages the
conversion of off-balance sheet contingent
contracts to credit equivalent and then subject them
to relevant risk-weights. Off-balance sheet
contingent contracts include letter of credit,
derivative instruments and loan commitments.

2.3

Review of Empirical Literature

Using logit regression technique, Dhumale (2000)
investigated the sufciency of capital adequacy
standards in Thailand, Korea and Indonesia using
annual data from banks and nance companies for
the period 1996 – 1997. The results showed that bank
portfolios were not up to the standards of Basel
capital requirements and might have utilized
cosmetic adjustments to increase capital ratios.
Olokoyo (2011) using regression analysis on
secondary data of 89 banks in Nigeria for a period

Although, due to some apparent deciencies either
arising from oversight of some risk or subsequent

70

APRIL - JUNE, 2020

Volume 44, No. 2
between 1980 – 2005 tested the effectiveness CAR on
lending behavior of commercial banks in Nigeria. The
results showed that there was a unique long-run
relationship between banks' lending, volume of
deposit, investment portfolio, interest rate, minimum
cash requirement ratio, liquidity ratio, foreign
exchange and gross domestic product. It also
revealed that monetary policy instruments such as
liquidity requirement and cash requirement ratio do
not impact negatively on banks' lending behavior.

in place measures to raise the level of shareholders'
fund to Total Assets ratio to avoid future bank
collapse.
Ugwuanyi (2015) adopted a simultaneous linear
regression to assess the relationship between banks'
capital and their risk-taking behavior in Nigeria using
annual data of quoted banks covering the period
2009-2013. The results indicate that past risk, size of the
bank, interest margin and capital adequacy are
positively related to variations in current risk, implying
that bank size and capital fuels banks' appetite for
risk.

Olalekan (2013) examined the effect of capital
adequacy on protability of deposit-taking banks in
Nigeria using linear regression for data gathered from
cross sectional research design and panel data from
published nancial statement of banks for the period
2006 – 2010. The result indicated that there was no
signicant relationship between banks capital
adequacy and their protability. The paper
recommended that the regulatory authority should
ensure that the gains of banking reforms were
sustained and that the Central Bank of Nigeria should
take more decisive measures to tightened the risk
management framework of the Nigerian banking
sector so as to positively affect their protability.

Moussa (2015) studied the relationship between
capital and bank risk in Tunisia from 2000 – 2010. The
author found that capital and risk were two important
variables and that there was a negative relationship
between capital and bank risk.
Ugwuanyi (2015) examined how regulation of bank
minimum capital base in Nigeria interacts with the
bank risk taking behavior using simultaneous linear
regression. The study covered all quoted banks on the
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) from 2009 – 2013. The
result revealed that regulation pressure has a
negative correlation with capital adequacy and risktaking appetite but does not signicantly affect the
capital adequacy as well as risk taking behaviors of
Nigerian Banks.

Multiple regression analysis was applied by Abba
(2013) to data sourced from the Nigerian banking
industry between 2007 and 2011 to empirically
examine the relationship between capital adequacy
and banking risks. The results of the study revealed
that total assets in Nigerian Banks were highly risky,
and that capital adequacy ratio reduces with
increase in deposits, and nally, that there was a
negative relationship between capital adequacy
ratio and risk-weighted assets. The study
recommended that Nigerian banks should adopt a
risk-based approach in managing capital and the
regulators should make every possible effort to
guarantee the safety of depositors' money since
increase in deposits does not necessarily result to
increase in capital adequacy ratio.

Alkadamani (2015) investigated the impact of capital
requirements on bank risk-taking during the period
2004 to 2014 for 46 commercial banks operating in
four countries of Jordan, UAE, Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait using the simultaneous equations model. The
results revealed that there was a positive correlation
between banks protability and increase in capital,
indicating that protable banks can more easily
improve their retained earning rather than issuing new
securities.
Umoru (2016) assessed the signicance of the capital
adequacy ratio in inuencing the nancial deeds of
Nigerian banks by applying generalized least square
(GLS) estimation technique for the period 2007 to
2015. The results showed an overriding effect of
capital adequacy ratio and liquidity in enhancing the
deeds of Nigerian banks.

Ikpefan (2013) investigated the impact of bank
capital adequacy ratios, management and
performance in the Nigerian commercial banks from
1986 to 2006 using ordinary least square regression
method. The result indicates that shareholders
Fund/Total Assets which measures capital adequacy
of banks have negative impact on return on assets. In
additions the result also revealed that efciency of
management measured by operating expenses is
negatively related to return on capital. The paper
recommended that regulatory agencies should put

Tobichukwu (2016) employed pooled regression
analysis model to check the capital adequacy-risk
management outcomes of the banks during the
period between 2009 and 2015. The results showed
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that risk management variables exerted differing
degrees of negative effects on capital adequacy.
The paper recommended objective-oriented deposit
drive by the banks to attract more deposits and that
loans should be adequately secured to reduce the
incidence of non-performing loans.

td denotes to total deposit liability of a bank, or
connotes other regulatory requirement, hence it is a
vector of variables including monetary policy rate
(mpr), cash reserve requirement (crr) and loan loss
provisioning (llp), while roa and bf are return on assets
and borrowed funds, respectively.

Using a structural model of two different simultaneous
equations, Maraghni (2017) examined the impact of
changes in capital adequacy ratio to the risk-taking
incentive of Ten (10) Tunisian banks between the
period 1990 to 2012. The results indicated that
changes in CAR was a consequence of regulatory
pressure and both institutional and legal framework
also affects CAR. They submitted that regulatory
pressure relating to CAR requirements induces the
desired discipline on banks in Tunisia during the study
period. The presence of safety-net and guarantees
by the Tunisian central bank, according to the
authors, leads to moral hazards.

3.2

3.

Methodology, Assumptions and Estimation
Procedure

3.1

Methodology

Assumptions

The model is built on the assumption that it is capable
of explaining the direct as well as simultaneous
endogenous impact of changes in risk (Δrisk) and
capital requirements (Δcar) as exogenous variables
so as to facilitate the joint identication of their
potential impacts. Other three prominent
assumptions surrounding the models are:
Assumption One:

Where Δ is rst difference, risk represents the risk
appetite of banks proxy by total loans, car stands for
capital adequacy ratio, and i and t are banks and
time respectively.

The study utilizes a system of simultaneous linear
equation to assess how the banks appetite for risk
responds to risk weighted capital adequacy
requirement of the regulatory authorities and vice
versa. We are of the view that for banks to meet the
CAR requirement, they have two options. They can
either increase the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 holdings
(the numerator) or reduce the risk weighted assets
(the denominator). To be able to effectively capture
the preference of the banks, there is the need to
develop a model that can consider both options as
the objective function, hence the preference for
simultaneous equation. Alternatively, and in line with
Maraghni (2017) both objective functions vary
simultaneously such that changes in one induces
changes in the other. In a clear term, changes in
regulatory capital requirement induces changes in
the risk appetite of banks and the reverse is also true.
Thus, the estimated equation becomes:

Assumption Two:

Where s stands for size of a bank in assets term, while
all other variables are as dened earlier. It is largely
assumed that as banks consumed their capital, at the
outset, to grow their assets. However, the interaction
of the size of a bank and her capital level exert
negative pressure on risk. As the banks grows in assets
and the capital follows suit in the long run, there is the
probability that the risk prole of the bank will decline.
Assumption Three:

All banks are expected to strive to achieve the
required level of car (i.e. car*). In this case, car always
moves towards car*. However, for banks with car less
than car* are expected to take less risk so as attain
car*. Banks with car above car* tends to either feel
safe and sometimes takes more risk. We are however
not oblivious of the fact that; other studies are of the
view that banks with car above car* tends to play
safe comparatively to others. This, according to those
studies is to prevent them from experiencing
regulatory sanctions as other banks as well as
maintains their reputation with customers.

Where risk stands for risk appetite of banks proxy by
two different variables: the rst considers credit to
private sector (cps) and the second the ratio of total
loan to total asset (tl/ta). Car is the risk adjusted
capital adequacy ratio, s stands for size of the bank,
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3.3

Estimation Procedure

Considering a structural model of the form of
simultaneous equation and the panel nature of the
data, our estimation will follow the tradition of
Maraghni (2017), which is in-turn based on the
framework of Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Arellano
and Bond (1991). Thus, the regression is a Generalized
Method of Moment (GMM) approach.

Regulatory capital to risk weighted assets for one of
the sampled banks recorded a minimum of -174.30
while the maximum of another stands at 47.57 per
cent, thereby yields an average of 13.62 per cent with
a standard deviation of 20.02 per cent. The extraordinary low solvency level of banks during the
sampled period is traceable to the period of global
nancial crisis (GFC) which escalated the risk
weighted assets and non-performing loans (NPL)
arising from the recklessness of bank managers during
the period. Return on assets (ROA) averaged 0.36 per
cent, with a minimum and maximum of -100.57 and
177.76 per cents, respectively. The standard deviation
of ROA is 7.37 during the observation period.

Since the model is built in such a way that the problem
of endogeneity can hardly be ruled out, we started the
implementation by conducting a Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test3 also known as regressor endogeneity test.

In conducting Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, we rst
implement equations 1 and 2 without the
autoregressive components. At the end of every
implementation, the residuals are generated and
included in the original model. We then generate the
Fisher statistics. The decision on endogeneity is taken
either by comparing the Fisher statistics with the
critical value as tabulated in the Fisher table or using
the probability value of the Fisher Statistics. If the
probability is less than 0.05 the null of the presence of
endogeneity is rejected and the reverse is also true. Or
the null hypothesis is rejected at any given level where
the Fisher statistics is greater than the tabulated
statistics and the reverse also applies.

4.1.2

The result of the correlation Matrix is presented as
Table 2. The correlation coefcients are reported for
the variables both at levels and natural logarithms.
Interestingly, the signs of the coefcients are, in most
cases, the same as their magnitude are close.

4.
Presentation of Results and Discussion of Findings
Considering the structure of the data, the regression is
done commencing with some pre-estimation
diagnostic tests to determine the presence or not of
endogeneity, as well as to explore the statistical
properties of the data and thereafter the main
regression was carried out. Thus, this section is
structured in line with the implementation procedure.
4.1

Statistical Properties of the Variables

4.1.1

Descriptive Statistics

Correlation Matrix and Unit Root Test

Coincidentally, the correlation between the level of
risk appetite of banks and its predictor variables are
positive in case of both level and natural logarithms
data, except for ROA. Interestingly, the magnitude of
the coefcients is highly close. For instance, while Risk
and CAR recorded a positive coefcient of 0.094 for
level data, Lrisk and CAR stands at 0.078 for
logarithmic transformed data. Risk and Size (s), Lrisk
and Ls were 0.962 and 0.938 respectively4.

Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables
used for the estimation. A cursory look at the table
shows that there are twelve (12) observations per
each variable across eighteen (18) banks over the
period 2007 to 2018 yielding a total of two hundred
and sixteen observations. The industry data is largely
skewed to the right except for return on assets (ROA)
which is positively skewed (Figure 1).
3

4

The alternative approach would have been to fully adopt
Arellano and Bond (1991) which applies a rst order
differentiation.

CAR and ROA were not logged due to the presence of
negative numbers in the series.
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The correlation between CAR (another endogenous variables) and the exogenous variables were similar to
that of Risk and its independent variables, except that CAR and PR recorded positive coefcient as against
CAR and LPR.
4.1.3

Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test for Endogeneity

The results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test are presented as Table 4. From the results, the probability of Fisher
statistics is in both cases signicant at 1.0 per cent, implying that there is no evidence of endogeneity in both
models.

2

See CBN Guidelines on mobile money
services in Nigeria.
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4.2

And this form the basis why most nancial economists
are of the view that high regulatory capital
requirement impedes on protability.

Inferential Results

The results of the estimated equations are presented
as Table 5. The table is structured into three broad
columns, with the rst conveying the notations for the
regressors, the second contains the results of the risk
equation and third, that of the capital adequacy
equation. For the risk equation, the one period lag of
risk returns positive and statistically signicant
coefcient, signifying that past risk fuels further risk.
This is theoretically coherent considering that risk
variable is a stock variable. Capital adequacy ratio
returns negative and statistically signicant
coefcient implying that as banks strive to upgrade
their capital to risk weighted assets ratio, their
appetite for risk is curtailed. This is also in line with
theory and agrees largely with conventional wisdom.

The size of the banks, proxy by the log of total assets
(TA) tends not to inuence the risk level. This could
probably be due the huge component of xed assets
in total assets. Ability to alter risk level is in no way a
function of the total assets but the portion of assets
that is not only liquid but also available for lending.
With positive and statistically signicant coefcient of
deposit portfolio (TD), it means that the quantum of
deposit has a tendency to heighten or lessen banks
willingness to take risk. In which case, as the deposit
portfolio rises, banks risk portfolio follows suit and the
reverse is also true.
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The results show that capital adequacy ratio is a
function of the level of risk appetite, size, total deposit
liabilities, return on assets, provisioning and ination.
Whereas the level of risk, total deposit and ination
positively affects capital adequacy ratio, size of the
bank in term of total assets, return on assets, and
provisioning exert negative inuence on the level of
CAR. The risk appetite of banks, on other hand, is
determined by the level of past risk, capital
adequacy ratio, total deposit liabilities, provisioning,
liquid assets and the level of economic activities. The
level of risk in the previous period, total deposit,
provisioning, the quantum of liquid assets and the
level of economic activities are positive inuential'
whereas capital adequacy ratio impedes on banks'
ability to develop further appetite for risk. From the
foregoing, therefore, it is convenient to submit that
capital adequacy ratio indeed moderates bank
appetite for risk and, as a feedback, risk taking
behavior of banks in-turn enhances capital
adequacy ratio.

Return on assets, although not signicant, yields a
negative coefcient. Total provisioning recorded a
positively statistically signicant coefcient in relation
to risk prole. This goes to say that, as provisioning
surges, so do the banks risk prole and as it declines,
the banks risk prole follows suit. Liquid assets (LA),
broadly dened, intensies banks quest to carry more
risk and vice versa. So do the level of economic
activities, in real terms (RY). A robust economy puts
pressure on banks to create assets to nance
economic activities, while a weak economy is likely
to dampen demand for loans, hence reduces not
only the banks appetite for credit creation but also
the demand for loans, such that with ineffective
demand, banks funds become idle. The level of
prices is however reported to play insignicant role in
the risk-taking capabilities of banks in Nigeria.
The capital adequacy (CA) results, reported in the
third quadrant of Table 4 shows that the one period
lag of CA itself, provisioning (PR), and liquid assets
(LA) are the determinants of the level of capital to risk
weighted assets ratio. While the one lag period of CA
is positively related to the current level of capital, PR
yields a negative coefcient and liquid assets (LA) is
positive.

The study, therefore, recommends the strong need
for the regulatory authorities to closely monitor the
determinants of the potential direction of banks
capital vis-à-vis their risk weighted assets, to serve as
additional mechanism to predict happenings in the
banks and possibly kindle further dig by the
supervising departments of the regulatory institutions
so as to proactively forestall the possibly of crisis.

The impulse of the result of CA is an indication that
bank characteristics and macro-fundamentals do
not dictate the level of capital to risk weighted assets
of banks in Nigeria. This is consistent with theory. The
level of regulatory capital, going by the strict
international regulations, as dictated by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the
regulatory authority in Nigeria – the Central Bank of
Nigeria, is a function largely of owner's fund and a
small portion of long-term investment funds.
5.

Conclusion and Policy Issues

This paper was an attempt to join the debate on
capital-lending relationships of banks in Nigeria. The
study adopted a system of simultaneous equation, in
the tradition of Maraghni (2017) and adopted
Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) approach
to run the regression. This is to enable us use two
different variables as objective function considering
that changes in one objective function is capable of
inducing changes in the other. A Durbin-WuHausman test also known as regressors endogeneity
test is then used to test for endogeneity.
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